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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
consolidated

appeals

the d

court's

order revoking probation and executing his sentence without further reduction in
Idaho Supreme Court Case No. 40775, and from the district court's order
revoking his probation and executing his sentence without any reduction in Idaho
Supreme Court Case No. 40776,

Morgan also challenges the Idaho Supreme

Court's order denying his motion to augment the record to include transcripts
from various proceedings.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In Idaho Supreme Court Case No. 40775, Morgan was charged with three
counts of delivery of a controlled substance (methamphetamine). (R., pp.18-19.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Morgan pleaded guilty to one count of delivery of
a controlled

substance

(methamphetamine)

and

an

amended

possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine).

count

of

(R., pp.23-24, 36-

40.) The district court sentenced Morgan to seven years with two and one-half
years fixed for the delivery charge, and five years with two years fixed
(concurrent) for the possession charge, but retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.50-53.)
After he completed his rider, the court suspended execution of Morgan's
sentence and placed him on probation subject to conditions. (R., pp.56-61.)
Several months later, Morgan's probation officer filed a Report of
Probation Violation. (R., pp.62-63.) The report alleged four violations, including
failing to complete a substance abuse evaluation or engage in treatment, being

1

unsuccessfully discharged from an aftercare program for lack of attendance,
admitting in writing to using methamphetamine twice in October 2009, and failing
to report in person to 15 out of 19 scheduled appointments with his probation
officer.

(Id.)

Prior to the admit/deny hearing on the probation violation

allegations in his first case, Morgan was again charged with possession of a
controlled substance (methamphetamine), which allegedly occurred in December
2009 (Idaho Supreme Court Case No. 40776). (R., pp.155-156.)
During a joint hearing on both cases, and pursuant to a plea agreement,
Morgan admitted the probation violations in his first case, and pleaded guilty to
possessing methamphetamine in the second case. (R., pp.67-71, 177-182.) In
the probation violation disposition on the first case, the district court continued
Morgan on probation with additional conditions. (R., pp.73-76.) In the second
case, the district court sentenced Morgan to seven years with three years fixed,
all suspended, and placed him on probation for seven years. (R., pp.187-190.)
In July 2010, Morgan was found to have violated his probations by being
discharged from an in-patient drug treatment program for continued rule
violations, and was ordered to complete a second rider.

(R., pp.78-79, 88-96,

203-204, 219-224.) After Morgan completed his second rider, the district court
suspended his sentences and placed him on probation. (R., pp.97-99, 227-229.)
In October 2012, Morgan admitted violating his probations by using
methamphetamine (10/15/12 Tr., p.1, L.21 - p.22, L.7), and following an
evidentiary hearing on the remaining allegations, the district court found he also
violated his probations by failing to notify his probation officer of a change in

2

employment, failing to participate in a drug treatment program, and
(10/29/12
judgments on the

, p.20,

- p.22, L

The district court

violations, revoked Morgan's probations and

executed his sentences in both cases. (R., pp.122-125, 255-258.) Morgan filed
a Rule 35 motion for reduction of his sentences in both cases (R., pp.126-127,
259-260), and at the end of a hearing on the motion, the district court stated it
would review the files and issue an opinion (R., pp.128, 263; 2/19/13 Tr., p.25,
Ls.12-16).

However, instead

issuing an opinion specifically addressing

Morgan's Rule 35 motions, the district court entered an Amended Judgment and
Commitment on Conviction of a Probation Violation in each case, reflecting the
original underlying sentences. 1

(R., pp.129-132, 264-267.)

Morgan timely

appealed both cases, which have been consolidated on appeal. (R., pp.133-135,
268-270; 4/4/13 "Order Consolidating Appeals".)

The only discernible difference between each case's Judgment of Commitment
on Conviction of a Probation Violation (R., pp.122-125, 255-258) and their
"Amended" versions (R., pp.129-132, 264-267) appears to be that the latter
judgments added a recommendation that Morgan participate rn the therapeutic
community program or be placed in a work center prior to his release (see R.,
pp.130, 265).
1

3

ISSUES
Morgan states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Morgan due process
and equal protection when it denied his Motion to Augment
with transcripts necessary for review of the issues on
appeal?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed, in the
First Case to further reduce, and failed in the second Case
to reduce, Mr. Morgan's sentences sua sponte upon
revoking probation?

(Appellant's Brief, p.4.)

The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1. Assuming this Court addresses the issue, has Morgan failed to show any
constitutional violation resulting from the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his
motion to augment the record with transcripts that have not been prepared?
2. Has Morgan failed to establish the that the district court abused its discretion
in not further reducing his sentence in his first case, and by not sua sponte
reducing his sentence in his second case?

4

ARGUMENT
I.

If This Case Is Assigned To The Idaho Court Of Appeals. That Court Lacks The
Authority To Review The Idaho Supreme Court's Decision To Deny Morgan's
Motion To Augment The Record; Alternatively, Morgan Has Failed To Show Any
Constitutional Violation Resulting From The Denial Of His Motion To Augment
Introduction
On appeal, Morgan requested transcripts from (1) his December 15, 2008
change of plea hearing, (2) his March 2, 2009 sentencing hearing, (3) his
January 4, 2010 change of plea hearing, (4) his February 1, 2010 disposition and
sentencing hearing, (5) his July 13, 2010 admit/deny hearing, (6) his August 2,
2010 disposition hearing, and (7) his January 28, 2013 disposition hearing.
(6/4/13 Motion.) The Idaho Supreme Court denied the motion as to all but the
January 28, 2013 disposition hearing transcript. (6/19/13 Order.) In his brief on
appeal, Morgan argues that the Court's denial of augmentation with the
remaining transcripts violates his right to due process and equal protection.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 5-20.) Should this case be assigned to the Idaho Court of
Appeals, however, that Court lacks authority to review the Idaho Supreme
Court's decision to deny Morgan's motion. Further, even if the Idaho Supreme
Court's denial of Morgan's motion is reviewed on appeal, Morgan has failed to
establish a violation of his constitutional rights.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one

of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the
5

facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct Apo.
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P 3d 786, 794 (Ct App. 2001 ).

C.

The Idaho Court Of Appeals, Should It Be Assigned This Case, Lacks The
Authority To Review The Idaho Supreme Court's Decision
The Idaho Court of Appeals has "disclaim[ed] any authority to review, and,

in effect, reverse an Idaho Supreme Court decision made on a motion made prior
to assignment of the case to [the Idaho Court of Appeals] on the ground that the
Supreme Court decision was contrary to the state or federal constitutions or other
law." State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618,620,288 P.3d 835 (Ct App. 2012). "Such
an undertaking," the Court explained, "would be tantamount to the Court of
Appeals entertaining an 'appeal' from an Idaho Supreme Court decision and is
plainly beyond the purview of this Court."

Id.

However, the Idaho Court of

Appeals did leave open the possibility of review of such motions in some
circumstances.

19.:.

Such circumstances may occur, the Court indicated, where

"the completed appellant's and/or respondent's briefs have refined, clarified, or
expanded issues on appeal in such a way as to demonstrate the need for
additional records or transcripts, or where new evidence is presented to support
a renewed motion."

~

Should the Idaho Court of Appeals be assigned this case, it lacks the
authority to review the Idaho Supreme Court's order.

Morgan has failed to

demonstrate the need for additional transcripts, and he has not presented any
evidence to support a renewed motion to augment the record. The arguments
Morgan advances on appeal as to why the record should be augmented with the

6

transcripts
Idaho

constitute essentially

same

Court in his motion - i.e.,

a sentence requires consideration of such and that
be violated without the transcripts. (Compare Motion

he presented to
appellate
constitutional rights
Appellant's Brief, pp.5-

Because the Idaho Court of Appeals lacks the authority to review, and in
effect, reverse a decision of the Idaho Supreme Court, and because Morgan has
failed to provide any new evidence or clarification in his Appellant's Brief that
would permit the Idaho Court of Appeals to do so, the Idaho Court of Appeals
must decline, if it is assigned this case, to review the Idaho Supreme Court's
denial of Morgan's motion to augment the record.

D.

Even If The Merits Of Morgan's Argument Are Reviewed On Appeal,
Morgan Has Failed To Show The Idaho Supreme Court Violated His
Constitutional Rights
To the extent this Court considers the merits of Morgan's constitutional

claims, all of his arguments fail.

Morgan argues that he is entitled to the

additional transcripts because, he claims, the failure to provide them is a violation
of his constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and the effective
assistance of appellate counsel.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.6-20.)

The Idaho

Supreme Court recently rejected the same arguments in State v. Brunet, 2013
WL 6001894 (2013). 2

Morgan did not have the benefit of the Court's opinion in Brunet when he wrote
his brief.

2
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In Brunet, the Court stated: "When an indigent defendant requests that
transcripts be created and incorporated into a record on appeal, the grounds of
the appeal must make out a colorable need for the additional transcripts." Brunet
at *3 (citing Maver v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195 (1971 )). "[C]olorable
need is a matter of law determined by the court based upon the facts exhibited."

kl

In order to show a colorable need, an appellant must show "the requested

transcripts contained

specific information relevant to [the] appeal."

Id.

"[H]ypothesiz[ing] that the lack of . . . transcripts could prevent [the appellant]
from determining whether there were additional issues to raise, or whether there
was factual information contained in the transcripts that might relate to his
arguments" does not demonstrate a "colorable need."

in other words, an

appellant is not entitled to transcripts in order to "search the transcripts for a
reason to request and incorporate the transcripts in the first place."

kl

Such an

endeavor is a '"fishing expedition' at taxpayer expense" - an exercise the
constitution does not endorse.

In short, "[m]ere speculation or hope that

something exists does not amount to the appearance or semblance of specific
information necessary to establish a colorable need."

kl

Morgan argues the transcripts from his seven identified hearings are
relevant, regardless of whether they have been prepared or not, because "a
district court is not limited to considering only that information offered at the
hearing from which the appeal was filed" but rather, "the court is entitled to utilize
knowledge gained from its own official position and observations," and "the
applicable standard of review requires an independent and comprehensive

8

inquiry into the events which occurred prior to, as well as the events which
occurred during, the probation revocation proceedings."
pp.13-1

(Appellant's Brief,

In arguing that the requested transcripts are relevant, Morgan cites

Idaho cases holding that a court is entitled to use knowledge learned from its
official position and observations in imposing sentence. (See Appellant's Brief,
pp.13-15.) 3 Morgan asserts that, because the court can use information learned
in prior proceedings when sentencing a defendant, transcripts of those
proceedings are relevant. But the mere assertion that the transcripts are relevant
does not make them so. Brunet, 2013 WL at *3 (see Appellant's Brief, pp.10-18).
Ultimately, Morgan fails to provide a legal basis for his proposition, and only
makes self-serving conclusory assertions.
Although the appellate court's review of a sentence is independent, as
noted in Brunet, the review is limited to the "entire record available to the trial
court at sentencing." 2013 WL at *4 (citing State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5, 244
P.3d 145, 149 (2010)). As in Brunet, the record in this case contains the relevant
sentencing materials including the original presentence report ("PSI") prepared in
January 2009, and the addendum to that report ("APSI"). It also includes three
letters to the district court written by Morgan, a letter by a potential employer
(Julie McKinney), a reference letter from a former employer ("Kleen Machine"),
progress notes by Road to Recovery regarding Morgan's substance abuse
treatment, and a psychological evaluation report. (State's Exhibit 1; Confidential

Citing Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-7 4 (Ct. App. 2001 ); State v. Sivak,
105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977); State v.
Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 105556 (Ct. App. 1989).
3

9

Exhibits 1 through 7.) In addition, the court orders that issued as a result of each
hearing are included in the record.
90-91, 120-121.)

(R., pp.20-21, 45-47, 67-68, 73-76, 88-89,

"Therefore, the entire record available to the trial court at

sentencing is contained within the record on appeal." Brunet at *4. As such,
Morgan "has failed to demonstrate that he was denied due process or equal
protection by this Court's refusal to order the creation of transcripts at taxpayer
expense in order to augment the record on appeal."

1L

Morgan further complains that "[t]o ignore the positive factors that were
present at the previous hearings presents a negative, one-sided view of [him]"
and deprives him "from addressing those positive factors in support of his
appellate sentencing claims." (Appellant's Brief, p.16.) Morgan, however, fails to
explain why that information cannot be derived from the available record or, if
such factors existed, why they should not have been presented to the court at the
final disposition hearing (assuming they were not presented, which is unlikely).
Regardless, this argument is representative of the sort of fishing expedition the
Court in Brunet said was improper.
Morgan next argues that "effective counsel cannot be given in the
absence of access to the relevant transcripts." (Appellant's Brief, p.19.) This
argument also fails. Addressing the claim that "refusal to order the creation of
the requested transcripts for incorporation into the record" results in the
"prospective[]" denial of the effective assistance of counsel, the Court in Brunet
concluded Brunet "failed to demonstrate how his counsel's performance fell
below an

objective

standard

of reasonableness

10

without the

requested

transcripts," noting "the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing is
contained within the record on appeal." Brunet at *5. The same is true in this
case.

"This record meets [Morgan's} right to a record sufficient to afford

adequate and effective appellate review."

lsl

As such, Morgan has failed to

show a Sixth Amendment violation based on the partial denial of his motion to
augment.
Because Morgan failed to show a "colorable need" for any of the
transcripts he was denied, assuming this Court addresses his claims that the
denial of his motion to augment with those transcripts violated his constitutional
rights, his claims fail.

11.
Morgan Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Not Further Reducing His Sentence In His First Case. And By Not Sua Sponte
Reducing His Sentence In His Second Case

A

Introduction
Morgan argues that the district court abused its discretion in not further

reducing his sentence in his first case, 4 and by not sua sponte reducing his
sentence in his second case. He specifically contends that his good employment
history, his performance during his two riders, and newly discovered mental
health

issues (depressive

and

anxiety disorders)

demonstrating his sentences are excessively harsh.

are

mitigating

factors

(Appellant's Brief, pp.20-

The record shows that the district court did not reduce any of Morgan's original
sentences when it revoked his probation and ordered the sentences imposed.
(Cf. R., pp.50-53 with pp.129-132, and pp.196-199 with 264-267.)

4
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23.) The record supports the district court's sentencing decisions; Morgan has
failed to establish an abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v.

Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland,
125 Idaho 499, 873 P.2d 144 (1994)).

C.

Morgan Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
Upon revoking a defendant's probation, a court may order the original

sentence executed or reduce the sentence as authorized by Idaho Criminal Rule
35. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing
State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 326, 834 P.2d 326, 328 (Ct. App. 1992); State v.
Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989)).

A court's

decision not to reduce a sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion subject
to the well-established standards governing whether a sentence is excessive.
Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28, 218 P.3d at 7. Those standards require an appellant
to "establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was
excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment." State v. Stover,
140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005).

Those objectives are: "(1)

protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3)
the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrong doing."
State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582, P.2d 728, 730 (1978). The reviewing
court "will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the

12

original judgment," i e., "facts existing when the sentence was imposed as
occurring between the original sentencing and
probation.

Hanington, 1

at 29, 218

as

revocation of

3d at 8.

At the time of his initial sentencing in his first case (No. 40775), Morgan

had previously been convicted of three felonies in three separate cases (two
forgeries and one possession of a controlled substance) and one misdemeanor,
and had been charged with many more offenses that had been dismissed. (See
1/8/09 PSI, pp.3-5.)

The presentence investigator noted in preparation for

sentencing that, despite Morgan's support from his fiance and her family, "given
the defendant's history and prior record, it is doubtful whether this alone will be
enough to stop the defendant from offending again." (Id., p.12.) The evaluator
recommended a rider, explaining, "I don't believe that supervision in the
community is appropriate at this time, as Mr. Morgan has had numerous felony
charges (including one for battery) and has not been successful on probation in
the past" (Id.)
The district court granted Morgan a rider and placed him on probation
after he successfully completed the rider program.

(R., pp.50-53, 56-61.)

However, within months after being placed on probation, Morgan violated the
conditions of his probation by failing to complete a substance abuse evaluation or
engage in treatment, being discharged from an aftercare program for lack of
attendance, admittedly using methamphetamine twice in October 2009, and
failing to report in person to his probation officer 15 out of 19 times. (R., pp.6263.) Before Morgan entered a denial or admission to those allegations, he was

13

charged with a new offense -- possessing methamphetamine in December 2009.
(R., pp.155-156.) After Morgan pied guilty to the new charge and admitted the

probation violations in his first case, he was again placed on probation.
pp.67-76, 177-182, 187-190.)

(R.,

Morgan failed to comply with the terms of his

probation (discharge from in-patient drug treatment for rules violations), and the
district court gave him the benefit of being placed on a second rider, followed by
another period of probation. (R., pp.78-79, 88-99, 203-204, 219-224, 227-229.)
However, Morgan again failed to comply with the conditions of probation
by admittedly using methamphetamine, failing to notify his probation officer his
employment had changed, failing to participate in a drug treatment program, and
absconding from supervision.
p.20, L.24 - p.22, L.9.)

(10/15/12 Tr., p.2, L.21 - p.3, L.7; 10/29/12 Tr.,

At the end of the probation violation disposition hearing

the district court stated:
This is not the first time we've reviewed this file. We've had a
number of probation violations, this being the third on the 2008
case, the second on the 2009 case.
I look at -- as I consider what would be an appropriate
disposition, whether or not there's a possibility you could be
compliant with probation, I really don't see that. I mean, this is -we kind of have some repeated behavior of using and then
absconding or not reporting and not making yourself supervisable.
Probation's not really an option. I look at the possibility of a Rider.
I mean, that's what your counsel is arguing. I consider that We did
a Rider and then, following that Rider, put you back on probation
and tried that; and that -- still had another probation violation
following the Rider return. So I think, frankly, that option's off the
table.
So I am revoking probation on this. I think maybe the
Therapeutic Community is the best bet at this point in time in a
prison setting. So I'll recommend Therapeutic Community. But it's
one of those situations with multiple probation violations. Problem14

solving court perhaps would have been something worth trying, but
that option's not available either. So with really not much left for me
to utilize, I am revoking probation on this, recommend [sic]
Therapeutic Community.
(1/28/13 Tr., p.5, L.19 - p.6, L.19.)
On appeal, Morgan argues that the district court should have reduced his
underlying sentences because of the following mitigating factors: (1) he had a
good employment record, (2) he did well during his two riders, and (3) he recently
discovered he had mental health issues (depressive and anxiety disorders).
(Appellant's Brief, pp.20-23.)

However, none of the factors Morgan cites

demonstrate an abuse of discretion.

While those factors are potentially

mitigating, they do not suffice to show that the district court abused its sentencing
discretion by ordering his original sentences imposed without reduction -especially considering that the longest fixed period of Morgan's three concurrent
sentences was three years. (See R., pp.187-190.)
In light of Morgan's criminal history (including three prior felonies), three
current felonies, and his repeated wasting of opportunities to comply with
probation and the law, he has failed to demonstrate that any of his sentences are
excessive.

The district court considered all of the relevant information and

reasonably determined Morgan was no longer a viable candidate for community
supervision or a rider.

Morgan's history and character, together with his

demonstrated inability or unwillingness to comply with the law and the terms of
his probation did not entitle him to reinstatement on probation, a third rider, or to
a sua sponte reduction of his underlying sentences.

Morgan has failed to

establish that the district court abused its sentencing discretion.

15

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
orders revoking Morgan's probation and executing his sentences for delivery of a
controlled substance (methamphetamine) and possession of a controlled
substance (methamphetamine) in Idaho Supreme Court Case No. 40775, and for
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) in Idaho Supreme
Court Case No. 40776.
DATED this 11 th day of December, 2013.

JO 1 C. McKINNEY ! )
Dep uty Attorney GeneraY
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